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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
BAILM!>NTS-CARR!llRS-CONVERSION-TuOVER BY BAIL!>!> (A COMMON CARRTI:R) AGAINST A THIRD Pi;:RSON.-On the facts as stated by the court of last
resort it is often difficult to discover why any action should ever have been
thought of, and impossible to see how the judgment of the trial court should
have been in favor of the preposterous claim of the plaintiff. Such seems
to be the case of Farmers' Cotton Oil Co. v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry. Co.
(Ala. 1918), 79 So. 387. Plaintiff carrier by mistake delivered cotton seed to
defendant company. Defendant by mistake, not even negligent mistake it
would appear, received and used the cotton seed and paid the freight. 'fhe
consignor and his vendee called off the sale, and defendant paid to the consignee the full or agreed price for the seed. The carrier then demande.d the
seed of defendant, and without offering to return the freight money now
brings trovcr !
That a bailee may in proper case sue a third person for conversion of
the bailed chattel; that such bailee as agent may sue to recover back his
principal's property delivered to a third person by mistake; that a carrier
who delivers the goods to the wrong party is ab~olutely liable and may be
sued in trover; and that one may be guilty of conversion though he acted
in good faith, and without knowledge of the true ownership of the gvods,
are all principles too well settled to need citation of authority. See, however, Mr. Freeman's monographic note to Bolling v. Kirby, 90 Ala. 215, 25
Am. S. R 789, and Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S. 259, Pacific Express Cc. v.
Shearer, 16o Ill. 215. It may be admitted that a bailee may maintain detinue
or trover against a third person who has fraudulently or wrongfully induced
the bailee to deliver to him the goods of the bailor, or who receiving the
goods innocently now wrongfully retains them. Walker v. L. & N. R. Co.,
III Ala. 233. But this cannot be extended to a case like the present, where
the third person has settled with both bailor and bailee all their just claims
for the goods and their carriage.
BouNDARIES-ACCRr:TlON OR AVULSION.-In an action of ejectmcnt the
plaintiff's right to recovery turned on whether the land in question was in
Arkansas. Prior to 1873 the principal and navigable channel of the Mississippi River swept in a curve toward Arkansas around the land in dispute;
across the peninsula of Mississippi land formed by this curve there was a
chute through which in times of high water some water flowed. Gradually
this chute increased in volume of water carried and finally, after many years,
it became the main channel. Held, that the state line had not moved to the
chute, hence the land sued for was not in Arkansas. Davis v. A11dcrso11Tt1lley Co. (C. C. A., 8th Circ., 1918), 252 Fed. 68r.
When the boundary line between states is a navigable stream the rule of
the tlialweg applies, and the line is the middle of the main navigable channel.
Arka11sas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158. The same rule ought to apply as between private owners. In case of shifting of this line by accretion and
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erosion the boundaries will shift. I7 MICH. L. R.Ev. 95; Gijford \'. Yarborough, 5 Bing I63; Lovillgston v. St. Clair County, 64 Ill. 56. Where, however, by avulsion a river suddenly changes its course or land is suddenly
left dry by the recession of the sea there is no change in boundaries. Gifford v. Yarborough, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra. In the principal
case the change in the channel was accomplished slowly enough to meet the
requirements of the rule regarding accretion and erosion, but there was
neither accretion nor erosion, for the water did not gradually "creep" over
the land. Although not strictly a case of avulsion the same reasons for the
result in such cases led to a similar result here. See also Washington v.
Oregl•n, 2II U. S. I27.
CA.'lRif,RS-PASSf,NGERS - NEGLIGENCE. -An apparently healthy passenger
fell in stepping from the platform of a ship's companion way into a life
boat, both boats being practically motionless. Held, it was not negligence
for a seaman who steadied her when she began the step to let her go before
she placed her foot on the thwart of the life boat. Goode v. Oceaiiic St1:am
Nav. Co., Ltd. (19I8), 25I Fed. 556.
Plaintiff made no claim that defendant owed any duty to assist her, but
having volunteered to do so, he must exercise due c;i,re. That a person under
no duty to act, \\ho volunteers assistance will be held liable for injuries
caused by his failure to exercise the proper degree of care is well recognized.
Black v. Rj•. Ca., I93 Mass. 448. In Hanlon v. Central R. Co. of N. J., I87
N. Y. 73, this principle is emphasized. Defendant's servant assisted t.l:ie plain·
tiff in alighting from a railway carriage and removed his support before
she got down, causing a fall and the injury complained of. The court said,
"The situation in this case it is true was not such as to suggest any serious
danger to the plaintiff in leaving the car: but, when the conductor assumed
to extend his aid in doing so, she had a right to accept it and rely upon his
act as being a careful one." This position is approved in Younglove v. Pullman Co., 207 Fed. 797 at 802; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Carlisle, 2 Ala.
App. 5I4; Moody v. Boston & M. R.R. I89 Mass. 277; Nashville etc. R. Co.
v. Newsom,• et ux (Tenn. Nov:, I9I8), 203 S W. 33. In Southern Traction
Co. v. Reagor ('l'ex.) I86 S. W. 272, the care to be exercised in such cases
is characterized as of "the highest degree." It is submitted the generally
accepted and correct statement is that the care to be exercised is such as an
ordinary, prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances, the
degree varying with the circumstances. Ry. Co. v. Newsome et u.x, supra.
The court apparently is not disposed to quarrel with this doctrine. It bases
its decision on the proposition that the assistance was only for the purpose
of helping plaintiff get started. No authority is cited in support of this
distinction. None has been found. On the contrary, the cases seem to hold
that the purpose is to assist in safely completing the matter in hand. Blaclt
v. Ry. Co., supra; Younglove v. Pullman Co., supra, at p. 8o2; Hanlon v. Ry.
Co., .mpra; Ry. Co. v. Marrs, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 388. The decision stresses the
fact that the step was an easy one, that the plaintiff was in apparent good
health, that the harbor was calm, etc., creating the impression that the court
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considered it as a mere perfunctory offer of assistance not expected to be
seriously relied upon nor seriously extended. On this point, Hanlo1} v. Ry.
Co., supra, would seem to be decisive. Defendant's conjectures on the extent to which the plaintiff intended to rely, or was relying on his assistance
should have no weight in determining what reliance the plaintiff might safely
place on the offer of assistance Defendant's act was the best evidence by
which the plaintiff could regulate her conduct and having offered his service,
he had no right to presume it unnecessary so long as the apparent need for
it was as great as when offered.
CoNSTITUTIONAI, LAW-WOMEN AS GRAND JuRORs.-The Constitution of
Nevada provided that no person should be tried for a capital or other infamous crime except on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Sec. 27, Art.
4, reads: "Laws shall be made to exclude from serving on juries, all persons
not qualified electors of this state." An amendment to the Constitution extended to women the right to be qualified electors. The petitioner in a proceeding in prohibition alleged that he was indicted by a grand jury composed
of men and women; and claimed that the indicment was invalid since the suffrage amendment did not operate to make women competent to serve on grand
juries. Held, that the indictment was valid. Sec. 27, Art. 4. was intended
by the framers of the Constitution, to substitute "qualified electors" for the
common law qualifications that men only could serve. Parns v. Dist. Court,
etc. (Nevada, 1918), 174 Pac. 7o6.
The prevailing opinion is hardly supportable. There is no need to resort
to hairsplitting to justify the conclusion that the court violated one of the
elementary rules of logic, namely, that an affirmative conclusion cannot be
drawn from a negative premise. BODE, AN OUTLINE OF LoGIC, 71. The dissenting opinion very correctly declares that the article "is one of exclusion
and not of inclusion," that there is "a wide difference between a statute
or constitutional provision which imposes jury duty upon a class of persons and one which excludes all other persons except a designated class."
The passage from Cooley cited by the dissenting judge points to the proper
disposition of the principal case; it declares that the Constitution "is not
the beginning of law for the state, but that it assumes the existence of a well
understood system which is still to remain in force and be administered, but
under such limitations and restrictions as that instrument imposes." Cooley
on Constitutio11al Limitations (6th ed.), 75. Thus, an act has been held unconstitutional which made possible a grand jury of ten men in contravention
to the common law requirement of at least twelve men. State v. Hartley, 22
Nevada 342, z8 L. R. A. 33; similarly, Carpenter v. State 4 How. (Miss.),
163, 34 Am. Dec. n6. Since the Nevada Constitution is silent on the question of the structure of the grand jury, the common law must be the source of
information on the matter.
At the common law the word 'men' was usually used in connection with
the designation of qualifications of grand jurors. Chitty speaks of "men free
from all, etc." See Edwards, The Grand Jury, 6o. Blackstone, speaking of
grand juries, said: "Under the word 'home' also, though a name common
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to both sexes, the female is, however, excluded propter defectum sexus."
Coor.Ey's BLACKSTONE (4th ed.), n23. Adjudicated cases are rare. There is
a strong dictum in Harlandy v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. I3I. The statute
under which "all qualified electors and householders "were made competent
to serve as grand jurors was declared unconstitutional because of defect of
title; but Turner, J., there said: "When legislators have prescribed the qual1hcations of jurors, the qualification that they be males has always been
implied •... and undoubtedly that which is implied would have been expressed if it had ever occurred to the members that a subsequent legislature would
confer the elective franchise on women .•.. 'every statute must be construed
in the light of the common law'." The point was later decided directly in a
I9I,7 case. The Code read that a grand jury was "a body of men"; but it also
provided that "words used in the mascuHne gender include the feminine and
neuter." The court refused to admit women to the grand jury saying that
men only could serve because "such was then the common law that women ·
were incompetent to act as jurors." People v. Len~en, (Dist. Court of App.,
Cal.), 34 Cal. App. 336-followed without an opinion in People v. Warner,
ibid. 8o4. Admitting for the sake of argument that women could not serve at
common Jaw the court in the principal case argues that "woman's sphere
under the common law was a circumscribed one,'' that by "modern law and
custom she has demanded and taken a place in modern institutions as a
factor equal to man." The Constitution, however must be interpreted in the
light of the common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. State v. McClear, I I Nev. 39. Radical changes must be left to the
people, otherwise the broadening scope of the common law would put a tool
in the hands of opportunists to be used in the undermining of the Constitution.
Dr;scF.NT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF WIDOW WHO KILLED HUSBAND.-Defendant was convicted of manslaughter for killing her husband. In an action
to quiet title to certain land which had belonged to the victim it was held
that under Sec. 3856 of the General Statutes of I9I5 defendant had taken
no interest in such lands as heir of her husband. Ha111bli1i v. Marcha11t
(Kans., I9I8), I75 Pac. 678.
In MrA!listcr v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 4 MICH. L. Rr:v. 653, it had been held,
following the more general rule, that in the absence of statutory provision
governing the situation a murderer was entitled to succeed by inheritance
to property of the victim. See further 7 MICH. L. Rr:v. I6o; I3 MICH L.
REV. 336; I6 M1crr. L. Rr:v. 561. Shortly after the decision in the M cAllistet
case the Kansas legislature provided that "Any person who shall hereafter
be convicted of killing*** any other person from whom such person so
killing*** would inherit. the property*** belonging to such deceased person
* * * shall be denied all right, interest, and estate in or to said property," etc.
(R S. I915, Sec. 3856). Conviction of manslaughter was held to be a conviction of killing and undoubtedly rightly so. Whether or not the statute
should apply only to convictions of murder, as in California (fo re Kirby'J
Est., 1o6 Cal. 9I was a question for the legislature to decide.
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Evm1mcE-AccoMPI.ICE-S:EPARATE CRIMES. - Defendant was indicted for
the crime of receiving stolen property. Defendant asked for an instruction
at the trial that the testimony of the thief should be treated with caution, on
the ground that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is entitled
to diminished credibility. Held, that the instruction was properly refused
since the two crimes were distinct-the witness could not be indicted for the
same crime that defendant was indicted for. Bailey v. State (Fla., 1918),
79 So. 748.
While most courts seem agreed that the testimony of an accomplice should
be treated with suspicion if uncorroborated, they are not all agreed in the
definition of 'accomplice'-especially where the act committed by the witness
falls into a separate class of crime. The principal case, however, is with the
weight of authority. A purchaser of liquor sold in violation of the law is
not an accomplice of the seller. Terry v. State, 44.Tex. Crim. Rep. 4n (nor
can he be convicted as an acessory), Lott v. U. S. 205 Fed. 28; the perjurer
is not an accomplice of the suborner, Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 98 Am. St.
Rep. 145; the donor or offeror of a bribe is not the accomplice of the receiver,
State v. Durham, 73 Minn. 150; State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502-Contra,
Ruffin v State, 36 ·J'ex. Crim. Rep. 565; the participants in an unlawful game
of cards are not accomplices to one another where each could be convicted
of the individual crime, Com. v. Bossie, 100 Ky. 151; nor is the purchaser
of a lottery ticket the accomplice of the seller, Boyd v. Com., 141 Ky. 247.
In State v. Kuhlman, 152 Mo. 100 it was held, as in the principal case, that
the thief is not the accomplice of the one who receives stolen goods. But in
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, the strongest of the contra cases, it was held
that the offeror of a bribe is the accomplice of the acceptor on the reasoning
that an accomplice is "anyone concerned in the commission of a crime". The
adherence to this broad definition renders it unnecessary to consider whether
the crimes are distinct. The other test is whether the witness could have
been convicted for the offense as principal. As far as the reason of the
thing goes it does not appear why the fact that conviction cannot be had
for the same crime should have the effect of making the testimony more
competent; the witness might seek immunity for the crime which he has
committed as an associate just as readily as he would seek immunity for a
crime which he and the defendant had committed as principals. As long
as they are associates in crime it can be of no consequence that the crimes
are technically separated-the argument of the prevailing opinion is mathematical but hardly meritorious. It can be condoned only on the ground that
there is some existing tendency to do away with this rule of corroboration
of the testimony of accomplices. W1GMORE, Sec. 2057.
Evrn:ENCE-AD:MlSSIBII.lTY-UNI.AWFur, SEARCH OR S:EIZURE.-\Vhile travelling on a public highway defendant was stopped by a deputy sheriff who
searched his automobile and took therefrom certain intoxicating liquors.
The sheriff had no· search warrant but had with him a copy of the state faw
which gave to the sheriff the right of search without a search warrant where
he had probable cause to suspect that intoxicating liquors were being trans-
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ported within the state of Idaho by means of automobile, truck, wagons, etc.
Before trial the defendant petitioned for the destruction of the liquor and
for an order that the same should not be used as evidence against him on
the ground that the statute under which the sheriff acted was unconstitutional as contrary to the search and seizure clause of the state constitution.
The petition ·was denied and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme
Court admitted that the statute was unconstitutional but held that the evidence was not rendered inadmissable by reason of its having been disclosed
by an unlawful search or obtained by an unlawful seizure. Conviction affirmed. Morgan, J., dissenting. State v. Anderson (Idaho, 1918), 177 Pac.
125.
The state and federal courts are in direct conflict on this question of the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. By a great number of decisions the state courts have admitted such evidence. The Supreme Court of
the United States, on the other hand, has vigorously denied admissibility in
the few cases that have arisen. It is submitted that the two views cannot
be reconciled but that they can be explained as a necessary consequence of
the widely different demands put upon the two governments. The states are
beset with the demand for a thorough and searching police system which will
insure a maximum of apprehension of all crimes committed. It is a serious
problem of local government to be able to deal effectively with the vast number of crimes that are committed within its jurisdiction. While the states
have generally followed the federal constitution in their inclusion of a bill
of rights with its search and seizure clauses and clauses against self-incrimination they seemed to realize, also, that here was an immunity which might
seriously hinder police administration. As a result we have in the Idaho
constitution a clause permitting arrest without warrant where the officer has
information which prompts him to believe that a public offence is being committed. It is apparent, then, why the state courts should be willing to blink
at the search and seizure clause, admit the evidence, iVilliams v. State, IOO
Ga. 5n, and tell the criminal to seek his redress against the sheriff. The
rttle that collateral issues will not be raised is, consequently, strictly followed.
Professor WIGMORE is thoroughly in accord with this point of view. Sec.
2183, 2263-4. The federal government, however, is not troubled with that
vast number of criminal cases which is a characteristic feature of the state
administration. Its problem of police administration is, comparatively speaking, an insignificant one. The danger of procrastination through the raising
of collateral issues is far less serious. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
been more astute to protect the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution.
The history of that court indicates that it has refused to close its eyes to a
violation of any of these rights or to relax in the realization of these· rights
merely because a collateral issue would be raised. "The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment," say:s Mr. Justice DAY
in Weeks v. U. S., "praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
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232 U. S. 383, 393. There are but few state courts following this view. Town
of Blacksbttrg v. Beam, I04 S. C. 146, L. R. A. 1916 E. 714; Iowa v. Sheridan,
121 Ia. 164, where the court sa~d that to allow the evidence would be to
"emasculate all constitutional guaranty and deprive it of all beneficial force
or effect in pre\·enting unreasonable searches and seizures". 'l'he Georgia
Court of Appeals refused to follow, for a time, the leading ease of Williams
v. Stale, supra, and declined to admit such evidence. U11derwood v. State,
13 Ga. App. 2o6. But the later decisions have returned to the conventional state
view. Hornbuckle v. Town of Decatur, 18 Ga. App. 17. While there is apparent conflict, then, it appears that each view is justified under the circumstances peculiar to the jurisdiction. They were nearly in accord when Adams
v. U. S. was decided, but Weeks v. U. S., supra, removed all doubts and
asserted the theory of non-admissibility in the most vigorous terms.
EvmtNC£ OF NtGLIGtNC£-PROXlMATS CAusii.~In Todd v. Traders' a11d
Mee/zanies' Insttrance Company (Mass. 1918), 120 N. E. 142, plaintiff brought
his action to recover on a fire insurance policy for destruction by fire of certain buildings. The fire which destroyed the buildings accidentally caught
from one set by plaintiff without getting permission of the fire-warden as
the law required. Defense was made that because the fire was set in violation of law the plaintiff's cause 'of action was defeated on the theory of contributory negligence.
It would seem that the case was disposed of when it was determined, in
accord with the universally recoguized rule, that the ordinary fire insurance
policy protects the insured against his own negligence, but the court discusses the question of whether violation of law is evidence of negligence to
defeat a cause of action, itself founded in negligence. It well states the doctrine that "the mere fact that he, (plaintiff), was violating a statute or ordinance when injured does not necessarily prevent his recovery. Such violation is considered evidence of negligence on the part of the violator, as to all
consequences that the statute was intended to prevent". The court concluded
that the failure to get the fire-warden's permission was a mere attendant circumstance of his injury and not a proximate contributing cause, and applying
the above principle overruled the defense There is plenty of authority in
.M:assach11setts as well as elsewhere, to justify the recoguition of the principle and its application. Moran v. Dickinso1i, 204 Mass. 559; Bottrnc v.
Whitman, 209 Mass. 155; Hughes v. Atlantic Steel Co., 136 Ga. 5u. One is
impressed with the rapidity with which things now move in that once consen•ative, puritanic state of Massachusetts. One is almost impelled to wonder whether the nimble-minded Celt may not have his hand on the throttle.
It is but three short decades ago that a sin-sick sinner over-anxious for his
soul's welfare, took to the highway with his good horse and carriage to attend a religious meeting on Sunday. He hitched his horse to the fence by
the roadside and while he was at his devotions another recklessly injured
Dobbin and the carriage. The court which pronounced this opinion in Todd
v. The I11surance Cn. told the refreshed sinner that because his horse and
carriage had reached the place of injury by having been driven there on
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Sunday in violation cf law, he was remediless. If the poor sinner's soul was
lost it would be a pertinent question, whether this opinion was the proximate
cause. L~•ons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387. Two years earlier the same court
took occasion to tell a provident head of a family that a railway company
could run over him with impunity because forsooth, he walked the public
highway on Sunday in search of shelter for his wife and children. Smith
v. Boston & M. R. R., 120 Mass. 490.
SPSCIPIC PSRFORMANC:E-NEGATIVS COVENANT-CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.

-Complainant induced defendants to enter into contracts with him whereby
they agreed to enter the service of complainant for two years from July l,
1918, and not to be concerned directly or indirectly in any other business
during the period of the contracts. Defendants at the time of making the
contracts were employed by the Driver-Harris Co., a corporation engaged in
important war work for the government. Complainant had been a director
of the Driver-Harris Co., but owing to disagreement with other directors,
had withdrawn and was about, as he alleged, to establish a rival company.
There was evidence tending to show that complainant's main purpose in making the contracts was to withdraw essential employees from the Driver-Harris Co. and thus to injure its business. Complainant brought three bills
against defendants to restrain them from working for the Driver-Harris CO'.
in violation of the negative covenants. Held, complainant is not entitled to
relief. Driver v. Smith et al. (N. J. Ch. 1918), 104 Atl. 717.
The defendants interposed a preliminary objection that the granting of an
injunction would interfere with work necessary to the federal government
in the conduct of war. The government did not seek to intervene directly,
but defendants introduced into evidence letters from General Sibert and others to the effect that the enforced withdrawal of the defendants from the
Driver-Harris Co. would be highly detrimental to the interests of the government. Lane, V. C., refused to consider this argument. "It would'', he said,
"be an intolerable situation if each court before whom the rights of individuals were litigated, were permitted to determine whether relief should be
granted or withheld upon its opinion whether the granting of an injunction
would aid or injure the government in its war activities. * * *" No
cases precisely 'in point were cited but reliance was placed on Broadbent
v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 436, and Rowland v. New York Stable
Manure Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 168. Though the doctrine of these cases has often
been brought into question (e g. Richards Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 105), the position
of the court seems sound. The federal government has under war legislation
ampl~ power to protect itself, and so long as it does not exercise this power,
there seems no reason why a court of equity in ordinary litigation should
consider whether its decree will affect governmental activities or not.
In denying relief to complainant, the court reached a result inevitable
upon the principles of equity. Complainant failed to show that the defendants could render him service of an unique quality; his remedy at
law was adequate. But further it appeared that his purpose in making
the contracts. was primarily to damage the Driver-Smith Co. Equity is
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not a punitive system and relief is always denied when it will merely make
trouble for a defendant without conferring any real benefit upon a complainant. Moreover a court of equity will not lend itself to the fttrtheranc~ of
schemes of which it disapproves. Edwards v. The Allouez Milling Co., 38
Mich. 46; Poll's Appeal, 9I Pa. St. 434- Due recognition of these principles
is taken by the court, but it proceeds to suggest other grounds which are
scarcely tenable. It is stated that the Driver-Harris Co. had a property
right in the services of the defendants (although they were only employees
at will), and that an injunction will never be granted if it will destroy a
property right. The use of the term "property right" is unfortunate. "Whatever be the effect of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, and Q1ii1m v. Leathem,
(190I), App. Cas. 495, it has never been snpposed that an employer has any
property right in the services of employees at will. Cf. Beekman v. Marsters,
I95 Mass. 205. Again, it is intimated (p. 724), that as the injunction would
not insure performance of the positive stipulations in the contract, relief
should not be given. This is but to revive the outworn criticism of L11mlcy
v. "fVagner, r De G. M. & G. 205, and coming from so able a court as that of
New Jersey cannot fail to excite surprise.
TAxA'tION-!NCOME-DIVIDENDS RECEIVED BY Hex.DING CoMPANY FROM
SuBSIDI.<\RY CoRPOR.A'l'IONS.-Petitioner was a holding company owning all the
stock in certain corporations except qualifying shares held by direc-tors.
'fhese companies under the management of petitioner carried on a large
business. "The subsidiary companies had retained their earnings, although
making some loans inter se, and all their funds were invested in properties
or actually required to carry on the business. * * *. In January, I9I3, the petitioner decided to take over the previously accumulated earnings and surplus
and did so in that year by votes of the companies it controlled." In a suit
to recover a tax levied upon these dividends as income under the Act of
Oct. · 3, I9I3, c. I6, Sec. II (38 Stat. 114, 166), held, reversing the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the tax was improperly levied. Gulf Oil Corporation ''·
Lewelly1i, Adv. Ops. U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 9, 19I8.
The decision in this case by the Circuit Court of Appeals was noted in
I6 MICH. L. IO:v. 202. The general subject is discussed at length in I6 MICH.
L. Rtv. 232. In the following cases the Supreme Court has disposed of some
of the most difficult problems arising out of this general situation. Lynch v.
Turrish, 247 U.S. 22I; Southern Pac. Co. v. I.owe, 247 U.S. 330: Lynch v.
Hornby, 247 U. S. 339.
Tur.tGRAPH Coll!PANIES AS CARRIERS oF MONEY.-The Carolinas furnish
two recent cases on a very common undertaking of telegraph companies, on
which strangely enough there are few decisions in the books, i.e. on the
duties and liabilities of telegraph companies as carriers of money. Reaves v.
Westcnz Unioti 1'el. Co. (S. C. l9I8), g6 S. E. 295, and Leh11e v. ib. (N. C.
I9I8), g6 S. E. 29. Both were actions for damages for failure to transmit
promptly money sent by a husband to his wife at a station where no money
order office was maintained, and the payment had to be made through a
bank. The latter case was one in which the mother of the wife was ill, and
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died before she reached her, but this fact was not known when the telegram
was sent. The other was based on a telegram beginning "Brother dead."
The one sought damages for mental anguish, the other punitive damages.
By a narrow construction it has been held generally. that the telegraph
company is not a common carrier, though it is in a public employment. Tel.
Co. v. Gri.rn:old, 37 Ohio St. 3or. By constitutional provision or statute it is
often made so, and the Reeves case holds that the provision in the South
Carolina constitution is merely declaratory of the common law. T}J.is is not
the weight of authority. Both cases rightly hold that a telegraph company
is not bound to establish a money order office at a place where the b11sines1
does not warrant it. but that it may undertake to deliver money by telegraph,
and if so it must live up to its contract. This it did in the Lehne case becattse it stipulated to use a bank to make payment, and that it would not be
liable for the negligence of the bank. In the Reaves case the company undertook the service and was liable for the failure to deliver in the time
promised. There seems to be little difference in the liability of the telegraph
company for the transmission of money and of messages. In each case,
perhaps, nothing is actually carried, but the effect of the undertaking is
the same. It is sometimes said that a contract to transmit money is a business transaction. and the measure of damages is to be the same as for breach
of a commercial contract. Hence there can be no recovery for mental anguish caused by failure to send money, even in states permitting such recovery on death messages. Robinson v. W. U. Tel. Co., rr4 Ky. 504. But
this has been denied, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wells, 50 Fla. 474 III A. S. R. r29 11,
and is not followed in Kentucky in W. U. Tel Co v, Sisson, r55 Ky. 624, in a
case where the agent knew the telegram was to enable a son to secu!"e the
necessary money to reach his father's bedside, the latter being at the point
of death. The telegram on its face did not show this. The recent case of
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bowm (Ala. I9I7), 76 So. 985 is to the same effect, and
so apparently are both the cases under review, the Reaves case saying puni•
tive damages might be recovered for failure to deliver the money where the
telegram showed on its face the purpose-"Brother dead", and the Lehut
case refusing the recovery of damages for mental anguish because there was
no evidence the agent knew of the mother's illness or death.
WILLS-JURISDICTION IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.-In

Iowa

v.

Slimmer,

u. s.

Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, I9I8, the State of Iowa, with a view to the ultimate collection of $13,750 in taxes against the property of Abraham Slimmer, deceased,
sought an order t<;> ensure the dismissal of Minnesota probate proceedings,
meantime asking an injunction restraining such proceedings, pending thq
. suit. The bill alleged that the deceased died in Iowa, where he had been
domiciled many years, leaving notes and Liberty Bonds valued at $550,000,
nearly all in the custody of his son in Minnesota. For at least five years this
son had custody of the notes of deceased, in pu~suance of a conspiracy to
defraud the State of Iowa of taxes. Probate proceedings were started by
the son in :Minnesota, and by the State of Iowa in Iowa. On the ground
that at least for purposes of inheritance taxes probate proceedings might be
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had in Minnesota, and also because the Minnesota court had power to distribute under the will the property located there even though decedent was
not a resident of Minnesota, the relief was denied.
The case involves both taxation and jurisdiction in probate proceedings.
Generally speaking personal property may be taxed at its situs, or at the
domic:il of the owner, or both. Buck v. Beach, 2o6 U. S. 392. The situs for
this purpose in the case of notes is generally the jurisdiction in which th·e
payment oi the notes must be enforced, and not the place where the notes
may be deposited, as they are not the property but only evidence of it. It
is not unconstitutional, however, to impose inheritance taxes on such property in the state where the notes are deposited. The principal case relics on
Wheeler v. New Yor~,, 233 U. S. 434. Bonds and notes secured by mortgages
may be taxed also at the situs of the security. Overby v. Gordo1i, 177 U. S.
214. Doubtless by appropriate proceedings the property in the principal case
can be reached by the taxing power of the state of Iowa. Bristol v. Washi11gtC111 Co., 177 U. S. 133· Wills may be probated at the domicil of the deceased, and also at the situs of the property, if such property is located in
a foreign state. Only by comity can probate proceedings in one state have
any effect in another. Whether a finding of domicil of the deceased by one
court can be collaterally attacked in another is in dispute. To allow this
question to be raised in different courts and before different juries would
lead to embarrassing results, as has been well pointed out in the monographic note 81 Am. State Rep. 548. See also Horto1i v. Dickie, 217 N. Y.
363, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 6u and note, holding that Ohio proceedings were not
conclushe upon persons in New York who were not parties to the proceedings. In denying the State of Iowa relief by restraining the Minnesota court
the instant case seems in accord with all the cases.
WORDS AND PHRASES-WHAT IS "FooD"?-An information was preferred
defendant under the Food Hoarding Order, for hoarding tea. The
Order defined "food" as including "every article which is used for food by
man, or which ordinarily enters into the composition or preparation of human foc>d." Held, tea is not food, and the information will not lie. Hitlde
v. AllmiJ11d (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 893.
The court was of opinion in the principal case that the Order was aimed
at those articles which are taken into the system as nourishment, and the
purpose controls the meaning to be attached to the words used. A simila:r
case was M erltt v. Beifeld, 194 Ill. App. 364, where the court held that milk
was a food or a drink depending on whether it was served as part of a meal
with eatables or was served alone, this distinction being deemed necessary
to carry out the presumed purpose of a contract for commissions on sales
of drinks. See also Leavett v. Clark (r915). 3 K. B. !J, which held that an
information for stealing winkles would lie under a section of the Larceny
Act referring solely to fish, because it had been held for thirty years, following Caygill v. Thwaite, 49 J. P. 614, that a crayfish was a fish, and the court
could not distinguish between a crayfish and a winkle in respect to its "fisha~ainst
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iness". The plodding layman may be pardoned if he sometimes loses contact with the rapidly moving "judicial front'' in the matter of legal definitions.
WQRKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENT ARISING OuT OF AND IN" THE CouRsi-:
oF Er.rPr.OYMENT-TRAVELING M.\N.-Decedent, employed by defendant to
travel about soliciting business, finished his work for the week on Saturday.
On Sunday morning in endeavoring to reach his home by crossing a river
in a skiff, the railroad being flooded, he was drowned. In proceedings for
compensation under the statute, held, claimants, decedent's dependents, were
entitled to recover, death having come to decedent by accident "arising out
of and in the course of employment." State v. District Court (Minn., I9I8),
169 N. W. 274.
Many times have questions arisen as to whether injuries received on the
way to or from work were such as to come within the above quoted provision of Workmen's Compensation Acts. Generally such injuries h;:.ve not
been considered to have arisen in the course of the employment. It is in
each case a question of fact as to when the employee enters upon or leaves
his employment. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 26. The right to compensation
is not limited to those situations in which the injury was received while the
employee was actually doing his work. As said by one court, "The employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of
his labor and begins it, nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time, ·
space, and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of
employment." Hills v. Blair, sttpra. In this connection the fact as to the
injury being received while on or off the employer's premises has been deemed
of weighty though not controlling importance. See Hoskins v. Lancaster,
3 B. W. C. C. 476; Simdine's Case, 218 Mass. 1; Stacy's Case, 225 Mass. I74;
Ocean Acc. etc. Co. v. lndttStrial Acc. Co., 173 Cal. 313; Hombttrg v. Morris, 163 Wis. 31. In the case of commercial travelers there are strong reasons for deeming them in the course of their employment from the time
they leave home in the morning, until they return in the evening, for they are
hired to travel. The principal case is in accord with Dickinson v. Barnak
(C. A.) 124, The Law Times 403 (1908). Cf. Donahtte's Case, 226 Mass.
595; Hopkins v. Michiga1i Siegar Co., 184 Mich. 87. Of course if the commercial traveler has abandoned his employer's business and is on an enterprise of his own there should be no recovery. In the principal case decedent was not engaged in any project of a personal nature other than the
effort to complete a journey undertaken in the furtherance of his master's
business.

